Uncovering metagovernance in government- third sector collaboration in Kano State, Nigeria by Ali, Abubakar et al.
Journal of Governance and Development Vol. 16. Issue 1, June 2020
21
Uncovering Metagovernance in Government- 
Third Sector Collaboration in Kano State, Nigeria
Abubakar Ali 1,2* 
Ahmad Martadha Mohamed3 
Mohd. Khairie Ahmad4  
1Kano State Polytechnic, BUK Road, Kano State, Nigeria
2Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government,
 Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 UUM Sintok, 
Kedah Darul Aman, Malaysia
3School of Government, 
Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 UUM Sintok, 
Kedah Darul Aman, Malaysia 
 4School of Multimedia Technology and Communication, 
Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 UUM Sintok, 
Kedah Darul Aman, Malaysia 
*Corresponding author: aali052003@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT 
Uncovering metagovernance in collaborative settings in Kano state, Nigeria, 
is the main concern of this paper. The central question explored was, what 
were the governing frameworks used by government policy officials and third 
sector chief executives (CEOs) to metagovern collaboration in the resource 
constrained state? This question was explored using an interpretivist 
qualitative research design that involved in-depth interview sources and 
document analysis. The interviews consisted of a total of 12 participants, 
six government policy officials and six third sector chief executives, and, in 
each case, lasted an hour-and-the-half, in three cycles, over a period of three 
months. The interviews were analysed with the aid of NVivo-8 software as 
a data processing tool. The study findings suggest that although there was 
no standard framework for governing collaboration that could be described 
as systematic metagovernance, pragmatic combinations of a dominant 
‘dynamic approach’ and an emerging ‘stable approach’ were employed 
to govern government-third sector collaboration in the state. Despite the 
limitations of this approach, it had prevailed in collaborative settings in the 
state for at least two decades and now urgently requires replacement. The 
paper concludes that for collaboration to be effective in delivering public 
services and publicly desired outcomes, key features of the dynamic and the 
stable approach to collaboration must be merged to co-create an innovative 
and resilient metagovernance system that will serve all actors involved in 
co-construction and co-creation activities in the state.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In most parts of the world today, government and third sector collaboration, 
have become generally accepted in principle and almost universal in practice. 
It seems that governments have come to terms with the fact that the third 
sector is a socially relevant partner in development management, almost 
as important as markets and public bureaucracies (Salamon, Sokolowski, 
Haddock, & Tice, 2013). It is estimated that the third sector contributes 
significantly to the global economy (International Labour Organisation, 
2011; United Nations, 2018). For instance, in Europe, where it is rapidly 
growing, it accounts for 13 percent of the workforce and provides full time 
employment to 28.3 million people across the continent (Enjolras, Salamon, 
Sivesind, & Zimmer, 2018). In the United States, where it is relatively well 
developed, it contributed an estimated $985.4 billion (or 5.4 percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) to the economy in 2015, with most of its 
giving (over 50 percent) going to religious, education and human services 
causes (Giving USA Foundation, 2019; McKeever, 2018, 2019).  
While the contribution of the third sector to most economies of the developed 
and developing world is statistically murky (United Nations, 2018), the 
situation in Africa, and to a large extent, Nigeria, the continent’s most 
populous state with about 200 million people, is even less clear (Ali & Ghazali, 
2020). However, contemporary government-third sector collaboration in the 
country is a recent development. It evolved out of a past that was associated 
with the struggle for inclusion and voice in public policy spearheaded by 
pro-democracy movements in the country during military rule in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Kukah, 2001, 2013). Government-third sector interaction in 
this period was largely viewed as adversarial (Beckman, 2010), and only 
occasionally collaborative (Nigeria Network of NGOs, 2020), especially 
with pro-regime and, sometimes, moderate independent networks.  
However, the last two decades have ushered in a stupendous rise in third 
sector growth throughout the country and the rest of Africa (Nega & 
Schneider, 2014; Smith, 2010). With this upswing had emerged myriad 
challenges: managing proliferation, defining partnerships, service delivery, 
corruption, security, and corporate governance compliance regimes. In 
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essence, the regulatory environment was in a state of flux. On the one hand, 
the Nigerian government sought to impose stringent controls (NGO Bill, 
2016) on the third sector to curtail its growing influence in public policy and 
service delivery, while on the other the third sector was demanding for greater 
inclusion and less regulation to enable it operate more freely (International 
Center Nigeria, 2020). This seemingly irreconcilable dispositions - although 
recently addressed when the House of Representatives rejected the “bill to 
regulate civil society” entities in the country (Nigeria Network of NGOs, 
2020) - revealed what all sides (government and third sector) recognised but 
could not agree on, which was the need for some form of metagovernance to 
deal with mounting problems of collaboration and service provision (Ali & 
Ghazali, 2020).  
Equally important was the realization that laws and mechanisms for 
governing collaboration in the country were relatively federal centred, 
opaque, non-standardised and sometimes informal rather than formal at state 
level. This impromptu situation, in the face of rising citizens’ interest directly 
and indirectly shaping public policy, which made this study pertinent. This 
study was, therefore, an attempt to uncover the existing approach used to 
metagovern collaboration in Nigeria’s most populous state, Kano, a land 
where secular based public service rules operated side-by-side with ‘informal’ 
Syariah law in the same bureaucracy; and where heterogeneous (secular and 
faith based) third sector actors were increasingly making inroads into what 
is predominantly a Muslim run public policy machinery; and, incidentally, 
where state policy officials and third sector chief executives (CEOs) 
respectively demanded for new frameworks to govern collaboration based 
on their self-interest.  
With a population of over 20 million, Kano state has more people than any of 
the 36 federating units of the country, including the federal capital territory, 
Abuja, and all the ECOWAS member states individually. Historically, the 
state was an ancient trading route that drew people from throughout West, 
North and Central Africa combined with locals to form the melting pot that it 
is today (Usman, 2008), a centre of commerce, Islam, and rising third sector 
pressure on policymakers to deliver public goods and services efficiently.  
METAGOVERNANCE 
 
Metagovernance is used here to imply designing and managing public policy 
through composite styles, and norms drawn from hierarchies, networks, and 
markets for the accomplishment of societal goods (Agranoff & McGuire, 
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2003; Meuleman, 2008). This implies collaboration of self-regulating 
networks in ways that produce new governance norms that translates into 
regulatory improvements which co-governors can then employ to solve 
wicked problems. This practical form of network management involves 
sovereign actors allowing self-regulating actors to freely express themselves 
rather than imposing excessive constraints on the governance space to stifle 
actor conduct. In this sense, metagovernance is ‘the regulation of self-
regulation’, it is about “how and to what extent it is possible for governors 
to regulate self-regulating networks” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007: 169) in 
their efforts to achieve socially desirable outputs and outcomes. In short, 
it is simply the ‘governing of governing’ (Bejakovic, 2019), or just the 
‘governance of governance’ (Meuleman, 2019). This denotes the practical 
coordination of heterarchic network governance processes on the basis of 
norms of reciprocal interdependence. 
Therefore, metagovernance is best understood by what is emphasised, that 
is, the type of collaborative processes involved in regulating self-regulation. 
The principal collaborative governors of metagovernance are typically 
government policy officials representing the state. Therefore, the state plays 
the leading role in metagovernance because it has the institutional, financial, 
and legal resources to do what markets and networks can barely accomplish 
without sovereign backing.  
The leading role of the state is thus well recognised in network governance 
theory. In fact, metagovernance theory generally was an attempt to bring back 
the state into contention in network governance theory (Marsh, 2011). In the 
first account of this theory under poststructuralist influence, hierarchies were 
somehow ‘fused’ together with networks, since government was presumed to 
be a form of network in a pluricentric system under a disordered polity where 
metagovernors attempt to influence the third sector in desired directions. 
The second phase of the theory entails the critical realist perspective, which 
defines metagovernance as partnership (government plus governance) that 
takes place in the ‘shadow of government’ (Davies, 2012; Pedersen, Sehested, 
& Sørensen, 2011). Here, government is treated as a principal partner and 
regulator of the metagovernance space. It exercises its power via hegemony 
in some Gramscian sense.  
The third phase is couched in the Foucauldian perspective which assumed 
that ‘threat and social control’ are prevalent in governmental structures. 
In other words, ‘governmentality’, for Foucault (2010), was the defining 
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concept that symbolised the state’s desire to target and exercise control 
over the population, its welfare and its conduct through rationalisation of 
its actions and subtle cultivation of citizens’ sense of self-governance to 
influence their involvement in their own subjection, thus furthering habits 
oriented to the ‘conduct of conduct’. In metagovernance terms, this amounts 
to the use of technologies of agency (that is network actors employing 
techniques of knowledge and resources for self-transformation to attain 
quality self-regulation), and technologies of performance (as in compliance 
with governing standards and benchmarks) that disciplines the mind to 
self-conform rather than challenge power. This population centred form of 
governance was combined with economic, social and ideological forms of 
control exercised through ‘governance at a distance’ rather than through 
direct coercion (Bang, 2014; Dean, 2010; Chamberlain, 2014; Raffnsqe, 
Gudmand-Hoyer, & Thaning, 2016; Rose, 1996).  
The general idea in metagovernance theory was to make sense of the 
changing role of the state in a world of growing networks, decentred 
structures, and institutions. The main premise was that the logic of structures 
that had dominated conventional forms of public management was being 
replaced by the logic of flows in the governance of social life (Davies, 2012; 
Lash, 2002). The various metagovernance theories, as outlined by Sørensen 
& Torfing (2007), were all attempts to capture this change, with each 
theory (interdependency, governability, integration, and governmentality) 
emphasising its own approach to the problem. Ultimately, we are left with 
no uniform ways of exercising metagovernance. Yet, the primary objective 
of metagovernance remains the same: conflict avoidance in situations 
of shared goal articulation, under realities that recognise the promise of 
metagovernance success and its likely failures. This paper operates largely 
within the interpretivist approach. 
 
METHODOLOGY
The preferred type of study employed here is a qualitative research 
methodology (Coffey, 2018; Flick, 2018; Merriam & Grenier, 2019). This 
was considered suitable for uncovering approaches adopted by government 
policy officials and third sector chief executives (CEOs) to metagovern 
collaboration in resource constrained Kano state. This problem was explored 
using a qualitative research design that involved in-depth interviews, guided 
by semi-structured questionnaire, as the primary data source, with document 
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analysis being supplementary. The documents analysed included official 
government and third sector records such as transaction letters, memorandum 
of understandings, and agreements covering joint projects of various shades 
implemented in Kano state in the last two decades; and extant literature on 
government-third sector collaboration from databases using keywords to 
source relevant articles, especially recent works connected with the main 
subject of this research.   
 
Study Participants and Data Collection 
This study focused on uncovering metagovernance approaches in 
collaborative settings in Kano state that involved the following participants: 
(i) government policy officials, elected and professional; and (ii) third sector 
CEOs encompassing secular and religious, male and female participants, 
who led networks that collaborated with the Kano state government in co-
creation and co-production activities in the state. However, the majority 
of government and third sector policy actors were men. Therefore, in both 
categories of participants (12 in all), the female presence (only three) was 
small, reflecting male domination of policy organs in public life in the state. All 
the participants were anonymized using appropriate ethical pseudonyms.  
The government and third sector participants purposefully selected for 
this study were those directly involved in, and were knowledgeable about, 
collaborative activities in the state, with at least two years’ experience in 
joint policymaking. For each category, we purposefully selected participants 
who were likely to supply full depiction of collaborative governance as they 
experienced it within the last two decades. The 12 participants in the study 
were divided into a group of six each side, government and the third sector. 
The number of individual interviews conducted in each group was decided 
by saturation. For each participant, however, the interview lasted about an 
hour-and-the-half per cycle. In all a maximum of three and a minimum of two 
cycles (Brinkman & Kvale, 2018) of interviews were conducted with each 
participant to capture their perspectives on metagovernance of collaboration 
in Kano state. Most interviews were held in the offices of the participants 
over a period of three months. The goal was to arrive at a thick description 
of the phenomenon.
Kano metropolis was chosen for this study because it was the seat of 
government and the most heterogeneous part of the state, from where diverse 
formal third sector chief executives (CEOs) collaborated with state policy 
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officials’ in co-constructing policies and delivering services, thereby yielding 
rich assorted data. The population of Kano as a state, and the diversity of its 
capital in political, cultural, economic and demographic terms, made it ideal 
for capturing the  range of data that reflected the varied perspectives available 
in government-third sector collaboration in the state. These characteristics 
laid bare the context of the study. 
Data Analysis 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim using the recommended secretarial 
method (Howitt, 2016). The interviews were analysed with the aid of the 
NVivo software. The analysis approach relied on constant comparison as 
suggested by Corbin and Strauss (2015). Here, a three stage coding process 
was employed: The first involved open coding in which key portions of 
the interview data relating to the research question was identified and put 
together as related concepts, depicting aspects of a participant’s perspective 
on the study phenomenon. The second stage consisted of a form of axial 
coding that brought together relevant parts of the data under a shared theme 
that reflected the participant’s views. This process was followed to treat the 
interview transcript of each participant until all 12 were completed. Next, all 
the transcripts were then compared to arrive at a composite picture of themes, 
including an overarching theme, which depicted the study findings. This 
entire process was recursive. It involved moving forwards and backwards 
throughout the data, comparing aspects of it to be sure of its relevance in 
answering the research question. Overall, the data was displayed in the form 
of quotes and narratives rather than visuals (Grbich, 2013). 
 
FINDINGS 
Analysis of the in-depth interview data from government policy officials 
and third sector CEOs resulted in our identifying two broad perspectives 
on governing frameworks used to metagovern collaboration in Kano state: 
The ‘dynamic approach’ and the ‘stable approach’. The dynamic approach 
entailed delineation of ‘stakeholder interest’, ‘ad hoc arrangements’, 
and ‘shared vision’; while the stable approach comprised attempts by 
participants to articulate lasting features of collaboration such as, ‘identity 
and coordinating standards’, and ‘institution building’. Thus, the overarching 
theme participants identified here was ‘governing framework’. This was 
linked with two attached themes as separate branches that were labelled 
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the ‘dynamic approach’ and the ‘stable approach’ to metagovernance of 





The dynamic approach participants frequently referred to in their collaborative 
experiences consisted of three elements: ‘stakeholder interest’, ‘ad hoc 
arrangements’, and ‘shared vision’. Collectively, these describe active themes 
that were generally fluid and unstable, and usually surfaced in government-
third sector collaboration.
The first ‘dynamic approach’ theme participants in this inquiry were concerned 
with was ‘stakeholder interest’. This mostly had to do with how competing 
actors defined, negotiated, and integrated their immediate interests into the 
collaborative process. Therefore, the dynamic governing framework was 
shaped to accommodate such interests.  
Asusu, a high ranking policy advice official, was quick to layout areas 
he deemed as ‘stakeholder interests’ under the dynamic framework of 
collaboration. For him, as for most government policy officials, the thorny 
issues centred on ‘the need to know’ certain things in advance before actually 
engaging with the third sector. 
“We should look at the contribution that is coming in. We have to know it”, 
he emphasised. 
These include issues such as data management, finance, human resources, 
project impact, monitoring and evaluation. 
Government policy officials repeatedly mentioned these issues as representing 
‘stakeholder interests’ in collaborative settings. 
A third sector participant pointed out that under the dynamic approach to 
collaboration, stakeholder interests were ‘generously’ taken care of through 
incentives embedded in the engagement process. Therefore, government 
policy officials were usually ‘motivated’ to engage. Asked what the 
participant, a key faith based influencer, meant by “motivation” in this 
context, Na Allah replied, 
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“Motivation can mean money, inducement, encouraging words, and things 
like that. Without it, collaboration will be impossible in our environment”. 
Another participant, Karkara, a ranking law maker, stressed moral values as 
part of what held stakeholders together in the collaborative process. These 
values, Karkara thought, were essential to his personal involvement in 
boundary spanning activities, and ought to feature in any formal construction 
of a standard governing framework to guide collaboration in the state. 
“If the NGOs come they have to respect our religion, tradition and dignity 
as a community. If they clash with these values then we say, ‘no’ ”, stated 
Karkara.  
This talk about religion, tradition, and community dignity ran throughout 
participants’ description of ‘stakeholder interests’, suggesting that both 
government and third sector actors felt strongly about the subject. 
In addition, there were participants who called for “the interests of civil 
servants in the state” to be factored into any governing framework meant 
to formally metagovern collaboration. As Malama, a permanent secretary, 
calmly but firmly stated, “We will like to see a framework that involve civil 
servants in projects.” 
Further, Bature, a representative of international third sector interests, 
admonished the local third sector CEOs by saying, “Don’t be confrontational” 
in approaching government policy officials; insisting that there ought to be 
‘consent’ before the third sector enters any community to implement a project. 
“NGOs should not just come and start doing work without identifying the 
entry points.” 
The question then is: who really are the stakeholders where collaboration is 
concerned? The government? Third sector actors? Community gatekeepers? 
Service users? Or, all of these parties combined? The dynamic approach to 
collaboration only provided partial answers to these questions. 
What the second dynamic approach theme, ‘ad hoc arrangement’, revealed, 
however, were three interesting perspectives about how collaboration was 
governed in the last two decades. 
The first perspective suggested categorically that there was ‘no’ standard 
governing framework that guided collaboration. The second perspective was 
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more ambivalent, as participants were not sure of whether or not there was 
a standard framework. The third perspective anchored itself on documents 
such as the military era edict on self-help groups, and project related financial 
guidelines, terms of reference (TOR), and memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) to imply that some working governing framework existed to 
metagovern collaboration. Even those who offered the latter perspectives 
had to acknowledge that, “We have to develop proper legislation to give the 
third sector stronger legal backing if we believe they are important to our 
development”, stated Sa’adatu, a leading third sector executive in the state. 
As for the third dynamic approach theme, ‘shared vision’, it described the 
co-construction of ‘strategic priorities’ for the common good. Participants in 
this study expressed their concerns about ‘shared vision’ when they talked 
about the lackadaisical attitude of policy officials towards strategic goals in 
collaboration. For these participants, constructing a shared vision was deemed 
a major challenge in the collaborative process. Boko, for instance, expressed 
deep unease over the sheer ‘vision deficit’ of government policy actors as 
regards engaging and constructing shared vision with the third sector. The 
participant complained that, “You hardly hear any policy maker stating 
that this is a sector that they need to collaborate with in the drive towards 
transforming the country. This non-recognition by the state is contributing to 
the problem of designing a shared vision”. 
Contrary to what Boko thought, however, some government policy officials 
related their attempts to work on a shared vision with third sector CEOs, 
especially in the rural areas. Adali, a participant with vast policy experience 
at trisector levels, and one time chair of the state executive council, said that 
where shared vision was concerned government took note of two factors: 
the registration status of the third sector body, and its mission or “areas of 
operation”.  
Adali clarified his thoughts this way, “We tried to lead international NGOs 
to where their support can be useful, in health, education and services”. He 
went on, “we set out certain standards” for the informal community based 
organisations (CBOs) rather than the mainstream NGOs. 
The standards required that the third sector body be ‘rural based, 
democratically led, with a written constitution that was consistent with 
community aspirations’, before the ministry issued a recognition certificate. 
And to fully ensure compatibility of vision, entities with similar objectives 
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were “brought together to form a bigger body.” This approach of government 
policy officials to ‘guide’ third sector vision seemed serendipitous, in the 
sense that the newly established office for NGO affairs was, “gradually 
discovering ways and means of operating”, said Adali.
   
To sum up the picture on the ‘dynamic approach’ theme under the main 
theme of governing framework for metagoverning collaboration between 
government and third sector policy actors in Kano state, we found that an 
overwhelming number of participants stated that there was no standard 
governing framework that guided their collaboration in the public policy 
process. Further, participants totally agreed that collaboration was approached 
through ad-hoc arrangements. In addition, slightly more than half of all the 
participants indicated that deference to stakeholder interests was central 
to their collaboration; while a few others still held that collaboration was 
governed by shared vision as narrowly defined by the parties for a given 
purpose.   
These perspectives tell us that there were shifting concerns and loyalties 
throughout the collaborative process. This, however, does not tell us why the 
‘dynamic approach’ (especially, ad hoc arrangements) persisted in the face 
of alternative ways of governing collaboration. What was clear was that the 
‘dynamic approach’ operated side-by-side with attempts to construct a more 
stable approach to metagovern the collaborative process. Participants shed 
light on these issues when they unveiled their experiences on the ‘stable 
approach’ to collaboration.  
 
Stable Approach 
The stable approach refers to an approach to governing collaboration that was 
based on a systematic process that involved defining corporate identities and 
setting standards (rules and regulations) for the construction of an enduring 
institution. This can be seen in participants’ references to “frameworks”, 
“standards”, “coordination”, “rules and regulations”, “procedures”, “laws”, 
“guides”, and related concepts that are basically entwined with efforts to 
build lasting structures. Stable elements in collaborative settings are therefore 
tied to some kind of Weberian thinking about quality, merit, legacy, order and 
stability, so as to avoid arbitrariness and needless disorder.  
Participants voiced their views on the ‘stable approach’ theme when they 
talked of, ‘identity and coordinating standards’ and ‘institution building’ for 
collaboration between government policy officials and third sector CEOs. 
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Karkara, for instance, outlined what he felt were key ‘identity’ issues for the 
third sector to clarify if it must fully engage with government in the policy 
process: “First, where is the NGO from? What are its core principles, mission, 
or vision? What are its objectives? What are its rules and regulations?” Once 
these issues are clarified in the context of their consistency and conformity 
with “Laws specific to Kano state, which entails religion, and federal laws”, 
then, collaboration can proceed.  
An alternative perspective on the identity question was posed by Bature and 
Boko. Both participants were of the view that defining the third sector should 
be the first step towards governing collaboration through standards. 
As it existed, “It was difficult to determine who the true third sector actors 
were”, stated Bature. 
For Boko, the crux of the matter was the image of the third sector, which can 
be saved, “If we retrench fraudulent NGOs”, through demarcating proper 
boundaries of conduct for members.  
In addition, majority of the participants proposed that third sector dependence 
on foreign support be drastically reduced by way of government “grant” 
to the local third sector. They wanted this to be made mandatory in any 
coordinating standards co-constructed for collaboration.  
Yaro was, however, more critical in his views on standards setting, stressing 
the need to certify and benchmark third sector performance. “Actually, we 
need to get value for money”, Yaro emphasised. Many public managers felt 
the same way on this matter. 
Another aspect of the coordinating standards that attracted the attention of 
participants was the modalities for constructing the framework. Here most 
participants favoured the co-construction approach. But, Doka, a policy 
adviser in government legal department, opted for a “consultative approach” 
in which government will invite third sector CEOs and relevant ministerial 
inputs, and then proceed to “Draft the law following the normal procedure 
for drafting a bill.” 
Some participants raised fears that imposing a uniform governing framework 
in this manner might obscure ministerial peculiarities, unlike ‘ad hoc 
arrangements’ that were perceived as suited to agency needs. These differences 
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drew attention to the tensions between special needs and uniform standards 
in the attempt to employ stable frameworks to govern collaboration.  
The summation of participants’ perspectives on the use of ‘identity 
and coordinating standards’ as frameworks for stabilising collaborative 
governance suggested that third sector identity was still an unresolved issue 
amongst government officials and third sector executives. Moreover, the idea 
of approaching collaboration through governing standards was accepted by 
most participants, especially government policy officials. For third sector 
executives, however, there were concerns regarding freedom of expression 
and operation. Nonetheless, majority of the participants were hopeful that 
resolving the identity and coordinating standards issue might bring about 
greater stability to collaboration and metagovernance generally.  
The next stable approach to governing collaboration was perceived by 
participants as, ‘institution building.’ This describes an approach to 
collaboration that was driven by a deliberate and systematic effort to 
make it more permanent through agencification. That is, establishment of 
an autonomous body that will govern the common affairs of cross sector 
actors.  
Participants approached ‘institution building’ from a variety of perspectives. 
Some talked about it as, “setting up a directorate”, or “creating a bureau”, 
with full powers to handle government-third sector collaboration issues. 
Others used concepts such as “strengthening local network capacity”, 
“actor sensitisation”, and “need for project implementation” as justification 
for institutionalising collaboration. For example, Bature commented that, 
“There was need for one agency in government that will be coordinating the 
activities of the third sector”.  
Other participant stated that multiple government agencies were responsible 
for coordinating third sector activities, with each having its terms and 
conditions for doing so. 
Adali suggested that, “Establishing a single agency will make NGOs function 
as a bridge between government and the masses, conveying government’s 
agenda, and working as its policy sounding board for effective social 
control.”  
However, there were other participants’ whose perspective on institution 
building was slightly different. These participants emphasised social 
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purpose rather than the ‘surrogate’ factor for institution building. The idea 
was that government could use the third sector chiefly for innovative project 
implementation, just like it is done in the developed countries; and for 
research purpose as well, since ministries have failed to effectively utilise 
their ‘departments of planning, research and statistics’ for its declared 
objectives.  
Finally, a few of these same participants mentioned the State Education 
Sector Project (SESP) as a model of what collaboration can accomplish in 
the state. Under the SESP, hierarchies, markets, and networks collaborated to 
deliver services, unlike the conventional ministerial contracts system where, 
“Only private contractors’ implement government projects”, stated Amana.  
Despite differences in what seemed contradictory motives for wanting to build 
permanent institutions to govern collaboration, participants generally agreed 
that this approach offered the best opportunity for stability and permanence in 
metagovernance. Therefore, the stable approach to governing collaboration, 
although emergent, gave most participants hope that if fully institutionalised, 
might positively change the future of collaboration in the state. While less 
than half of all the participants commented on ‘institution building’ and the 
‘stable approach’ to collaboration, their views manifested the concerns of the 
majority around standardising co-governance mechanisms for better service 
delivery in the state.  
The core finding here is that the overwhelming majority of the participants 
indicated that collaboration had been based on pragmatism anchored largely 
on the dynamic approach, as there was no standard governing framework to 
guide the process and guarantee stability. Yet, a few of these same participants 
cited ongoing government efforts to construct a stable framework as a threat 
to collaboration, as it might be used to adversely regulate third sector conduct. 
The majority of participants indicated that in the absence of a standard 
governing framework to guide collaboration, ad-hoc arrangements prevailed. 
This dynamic approach, although imperfect, was deemed realistic by most 
participants. Yet, these same participants generally expressed a preference 
for the stable approach towards collaborative governance.  
DISCUSSION
Having interviewed and dissected documentary sources on collaborative 
activities between government policy officials and third sector chief 
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executives, we uncovered two major approaches that governed collaboration 
in the policy process in Kano state. These approaches were identified as the 
‘dynamic approach’ and the ‘stable approach’.  
The study findings can therefore be summed up by saying that there was, first, 
the predominance of the dynamic over the stable approach to collaboration. 
Second, that there was absence of standard governing framework to guide 
actor conduct in collaborative settings. Third, there were emerging efforts, 
mostly driven by government policy officials, to standardise collaboration 
so as to make it more effective and lasting. Then there was the fear factor, 
expressed by a few participants who thought that introduction of a standard 
governing framework might be used to adversely regulate third sector 
conduct.  
It is significant to note, however, that the two broad approaches to governing 
collaboration uncovered by the study, the ‘dynamic approach’ and the ‘stable 
approach’, seemed to traverse the same broad continuum. In essence, they 
were consistent with the wider regulation, co-production, co-creation, and 
governance literature (Brandsen, Steen, & Verschuere, 2018; Sørensen, 2014) 
that associated government regulatory conduct with attempts to secure and 
stabilise modes of governance for capitalist development (Jessop in Bevir, 
2007a), and create subtle norms of conformity as envisaged in Foucault’s 
govenmentality (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). 
The ‘dynamic approach’ represented the early stages of collaboration, while the 
‘stable approach’ reflected qualities associated with later stages of collaboration 
where actor roles are more clearly defined and governing frameworks more 
standardised as recognised mechanisms for metagovernance. Thus, both the 
dynamic and stable approaches participants described were suggested in the 
literature (Jessop in Bevir, 2007b: 233; Milward, 2015: 217-218) as meaning 
making and values transmission mechanisms that were indicative of “some 
conditions for effective governance” and elements of “design principles” 
for good results in governance. In this sense, they symbolized both the 
technologies of agency and technologies of performance at work.  
Analytic Categories 
We developed two analytic categories to capture and reflect the two broad 
approaches to governing collaboration as reported by the participants. The 
first analytic category we labelled, “Dynamism without Stability.” The second 
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analytic category we named, “Stability through Innovative Metagovernance.” 
Both categories are interlinked and discussed as follows. 
 
Dynamism without Stability 
The recurring themes where the dynamic approach to governing collaboration 
was concerned appeared to be three. The first was defining ‘stakeholder 
interest’; the second was constructing a ‘shared vision’ in the face of 
competing policy outlooks between typically third sector executives and 
government policy officials. The third question had to do with the use of ‘ad 
hoc arrangements’ to facilitate collaboration.  
Usually, government policy officials perceived of themselves as both 
“stakeholders and gatekeepers.” Whereas third sector CEOs designated 
themselves as “community stakeholders”. In this sense, they seemed to 
assume an ‘unelected representative’ role for themselves in public policy. 
For Nadia, this was necessary because, “When the law makers are bought 
over by the government, we NGOs become the alternative voice.” 
But the main complaint from both sides, the evidence shows, was about 
“transparency.” Government policy actors repeatedly charged that third 
sector chief executives were “not forthcoming about their budgets”, or their 
full package of commitment to the government in terms of, say, resource 
commitment, data management, capacity building or monitoring and 
evaluation. Here, it seemed, while government policy officials were thinking 
and acting in terms of regime life cycle (4-8 years), third sector CEOs were 
doing the same thing, but in terms of project life cycle (usually 1-3 years). 
Therefore, both sides, it appeared, were self-centred and unable to reconcile 
these differences. Consequently, complaint about non-transparency and poor 
accountability persisted. This was not unusual in collaborative settings where 
corruption had become an inveterate problem (Smith, 2012; 2010). 
A similar perspective was expressed when participants talked about the 
construction of ‘shared vision’, to facilitate collaboration. Agenda setting and 
intervention domains seemed to be the main bone of contention here. Beneath 
this veneer, however, there was what can be described as ‘philosophical 
nuances’ in vision, where heterogeneous secular oriented local third sector 
CEOs tended to tilt policy initiatives towards secular ideas reflecting 
‘partner’ preferences, while government policy officials tended to opt for 
seemingly ‘religious policy outlooks’ to arouse ummah (Islamic community) 
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support. These ‘vision differences’ had manifested themselves in issue areas 
that included girl child education, child rights, women’s rights, and gender 
and sexuality matters generally. The literature suggests that these questions 
were not unusual in predominantly Muslim societies (Abbas & Hamid, 2019; 
Mazrui, 2012; Ruby, 2019), which partly explain why Kano was viewed by 
many ‘partners’ as “highly sensitive and volatile” where collaboration was 
concerned. Bature suggested that “To succeed in collaboration in Kano is to 
succeed anywhere else in Nigeria”. 
Another aspect of shared vision and stakeholder interest that participants found 
disturbing was election related policy shifts. Typically this had to do with an 
outgoing administration being replaced by an incoming one. This transition 
period is usually replete with uncertainty in relations between third sector 
CEOs and newly appointed policy officials. Where the bureaucratic machinery 
is weak and the higher civil service heavily politicised, policy instability 
becomes the order of the day. Anonymity, neutrality and professionalism are 
compromised. Therefore, policy advice officials were typically unable to 
sell ‘continuity in collaboration’ to incoming policymakers. For this reason, 
collaborative projects were usually tied to regime lifespan to avoid abrupt 
cancellation or abandonment under a new administration.  
The third theme in the dynamic approach that participants were concerned 
with was ‘ad hoc arrangement.’ This component of the dynamic approach to 
governing collaboration received far more attention in participants’ narrative 
than the ‘stakeholder interest’ and ‘shared vision’ themes combined.  
From the perspective of an overwhelming number of government policy 
executives, ad hoc arrangement problems in collaboration were mostly third 
sector related: its classification and identity, its registration and funding 
profile, its board membership, organisational form, transparency, and 
accountability, and even its disparate roles and ever-changing agenda, right 
down to its turnover, all were matters deemed necessary for serious scrutiny 
if collaboration was to be effective.  
Government policy officials largely associated these problems with 
what they perceived as the absence of standard governing framework to 
metagovern collaboration. Despite this absence of governing standards, 
collaboration proceeded on ad hoc basis with tools such as MOUs, terms of 
reference (TOR), financial guidelines, and, “reporting formats and reporting 
templates”, said Amana. 
38
  JGD Vol. 16. Issue 1, June 2020, 21-48
The reporting format referred to periodic reports that engaged third sector 
actors had to submit (monthly, quarterly as agreed) each time they completed 
a defined phase of an assignment. It was usually part of the agreement or TOR 
that third sector service providers had to comply with. The aim, basically, 
was to ensure rule based ethical conduct (transparency/accountability) and 
effective service delivery. 
The main question to ask, in the light of the assorted problems associated 
with the ad hoc approach to collaboration was, why did it persist despite 
government policy officials repeated claims of preference for uniform 
governing standards to manage collaboration? A preference that they 
shared with a few third sector chief executives with close ties to the higher 
bureaucracy. The apparent reason appears to be what we already mentioned 
earlier regarding the benefits of the dynamic approach to collaboration: 
flexibility, convenience, and innovation.  
Despite these seeming benefits of the ad hoc arrangement, many participants 
insisted that its cost outweighed its benefits. Participants reasoned that it was 
often arbitrary and allowed little or no room for strategic thinking or planning 
for efficient collaboration. In fact, it was deemed so unstable that any party 
can opt out of, or abandon, projects as they please without due consideration 
given to the implications on service users or the targeted community. Being 
ad hoc, after all, implied little pre-planning, pressing need, and quick action 
taken for a specific purpose. 
As Doka reasoned, “Government can engage with an NGO or development 
partner to do a project for a year or two and then leave without any 
consideration for sustainability.”   
A few of the participants who expressed strong opposition to the ad hoc 
arrangement extended their criticism to the entire dynamic approach, which 
they viewed as corrupt, malfeasance prone; unpredictable, averse to long term 
planning and proper metagovernance. This state of affairs, the participants’ 
assumed, made the ad hoc arrangement and the entire dynamic approach to 
collaboration to persist. 
Nadia, in particular, heaped the blame on government policy officials when 
she said, “They like it this way because there is confusion, no proper rules 
of engagement. Each ministry takes advantage of the situation to make 
money.” This seeming vacuum, the participant felt, was being exploited by 
government policy officials steep in ‘self-service.’  
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Amidst these complex ad hoc arrangement challenges, some third sector 
participants, like their government counterparts, felt that it was time to craft 
a standard governing framework to metagovern collaboration. This desire it 
seems was primarily driven by the need to attract budgetary support to the 
third sector for execution of community level projects, while leaving aside 
issues of network proliferation, intervention, performance, transparency, and 
accountability as secondary.   
For Sa’adatu, what is to be asked here is this:  “Why insist on imposing 
governing standards? Who and who will be involved in writing the governing 
framework?”  This question hints at Castells (2007; 2011) proposition 
on power in network arrangements, as those who determine ‘the rules of 
inclusion and exclusion’ typically determine the collaborative boundary. That 
is, they set the rules of engagement, the terms and conditions, the governing 
framework for metagovernance. This brings us to the second category for 
analysis. 
Stability through Innovative Metagovernance  
For those participants seeking what they viewed as stability and order in 
collaboration, constructing standard governing framework was simply a 
matter of necessity in a resource challenged setting such as Kano. Introducing 
a uniform governing standard, they reasoned, will accomplish two things: 
weed out fraudulent third sector actors whom they felt were giving voluntary 
work a bad name; and provide a platform for order, stability, predictability, 
and quality permanence in collaboration generally.  
Furthermore, most participants who favoured the stable approach saw 
registration with the corporate affairs commission (CAC) and relevant state 
agencies as inadequate to overcome the instability they associated with 
the dominant dynamic approach to collaboration. They viewed individual 
state agency collaboration requirements as too narrow and divergent, while 
CAC registration guidelines as too broad to cater for state peculiarities. For 
these reasons, participants assumed that locally constructed frameworks 
might accommodate these differences, and even new realities regarding the 
complexity, conduct, scope, and size of the third sector. The outcome, they 
believed, might be collaborative metagovernance in line with what Asusu 
frequently described as, “international best practice”.    
The best practice Asusu, and most government and third sector policy officials 
who favoured a uniform governing standard talked about was itself not clearly 
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defined. Yet participant’s views seemed to vary from those like Doka, who 
suggested enactment of ‘juridico-political law’ to metagovern collaboration, 
to actors like Na Allah who were interested in a less intrusive and more 
inclusive oriented framework. The problem, Bature cautioned, “Is where 
government tries to become too stringent.” In this case, imposing excessive 
limitations on the operations of the third sector “will be counterproductive.” 
Fears of this nature, studies (Ntumba, 2018; Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & 
Henry, 2018) have shown, run across third sector experiences in most parts 
of the world, rich as well as poor. Besides, ‘best practice’ replications or 
the “blueprint approach” have led to colossal governance failures, as it 
tends to ignore context peculiarity and local “values, traditions and history” 
(Bejakovic, 2019: 111). 
Part of the reason for this is that state actors use unilaterally constructed 
governing frameworks to exclude unwanted actors and include surrogates in 
command positions to ostensibly metagovern collaboration. In some instances 
third sector actors have been labelled “foreign agents.” “That is why we are 
worried about this uniform coordinating standards thing. They just want to 
use it to control us and make money for themselves”, stated Nadia. Recent 
experiences of third sector actors in Africa, England and Wales (Kelly, 2019) 
lend credence to these fears.  
Despite these concerns from a few mostly third sector actors, the general 
view, expressed by Amana, was that, “Getting to know who the genuine third 
sector actors are was a matter of state responsibility.” Therefore the identity 
of sector members was considered an important component of collaborative 
frameworks. 
On their part, third sector actors were themselves agreed that ‘identity’ was 
crucial, but suggested that, “Government fronts in the NGO business are the 
real problem. They are the bad eggs in the system”, said Karkara.  
As events transpired, both government and third sector actors were increasingly 
overwhelmed by anomalies accompanying the dynamic approach. This might 
explain their seemingly collective demand for proper ‘rules of engagement’, 
‘coordination framework’, or ‘partner coordination forum’, suggesting 
various efforts meant to standardise governing frameworks for successful 
metagovernance. As Ngai-Ling and Jessop (2019) observed, solidarity has to 
be restored to its proper place for metagovernance to be truly meaningful. 
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As far as the public governance literature is concerned, the imperative of 
collaboration invites some form of governing standards. Bevir (2013) 
and McCarthy and Thompson (2020) have argued that governance is rule 
based and law governed, and metagovernance operates under government’s 
regulatory space. In other words, laws of cross boundary interactions are part 
of what defines the new governance system and makes it distinct from the 
conventional government approach to policymaking. Therefore, although the 
terminologies participants used to describe the ‘governing framework’ may 
differ, their common desire seemed to hint at an agreed body of norms to 
metagovern collaboration. These norms are well articulated in the works of 
Bejakovic (2019), Meuleman (2019), Holzscheiter, Bahr, and Pantzerhielm 
(2016) and Sørensen and Torfing (2016).  
Another dimension to the stable approach had to do with the proposed contents 
and modalities for constructing ‘coordinating standards’. Government policy 
actors seemed to favour requirements for collaboration such as, “full financial 
disclosure” and “income tax”, both issues that have triggered worries about 
state intentions amongst third sector CEOs. For Boko, the important thing 
was to, “Retrench non-performing NGOs”, without penalising the performing 
ones. This emphasis on performance raised questions around ownership 
rights (belongingness) versus results, while the focus on fiscal questions 
suggest the persistence of state control in the metagovernance architecture. 
The next stable approach to collaboration is what participants perceived as 
‘institution building.’ This was mainly interpreted to mean setting up a formal 
agency to be in charge of collaboration. As Adali stated, “You have to put a 
permanent structure in place, backed by law, so that there will be continuity.” 
This permanent structure was variously described by participants as a 
“Directorate”, “NGO office”, “Agency for Third Sector Affairs” or “Donor 
coordination office.”   
For the most part, government policy officials claimed that they wanted the 
coordinating standards to address the following problems: ‘Coordination of 
development partner activities for implementation purpose; Weak capacity 
of the government to coordinate and harmonize partner activities; Absence 
of a robust framework to monitor and harmonise partner activities; and 
Duplication of partner activities in some sectors’ (Kano State, 2017). These 
formal aims represented the government’s policy on collaboration through 
governing standards. But beneath the surface, however, there appeared to be 
another purpose of the policy: to control, monitor and tax the third sector.  
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In fact, the government’s formal reason for desiring ‘coordination’ hinted 
at this with the words “monitor and harmonise”. These expressions might 
well spell greater state scrutiny and likely trimming down of the third sector. 
Yet, government actors were keen to point out to us that all they wanted 
was to ensure, “full transparency and standardisation of counterpart funding 
arrangements, nothing more”, stated Amana. But in reality their decisions 
have full implications for distribution of benefits, and reflects asymmetry in 
power relations with the third sector. 
At this stage of the discussion, it is necessary to reflect on how the question 
of governing framework for standardising collaboration relates to the 
extant governance literature. Part of this reflection was already conveyed 
in the preceding paragraphs with reference to the works of Ponte, Gibbon, 
& Vestergaard (2011), Bevir (2013), and Castelles (2011). The works of 
Gjaltema, Biesbroek, and Termeer (2019) and Torfing (2019) equally provide 
useful insights into issues of collaborative governing frameworks, basically 
subsumed under metagovernance analysis. These works lend weight to the 
idea that public governance works better under collaborative governing 
frameworks that serve as platforms for public service innovation, through 
tapping knowledge, experience, and capacity of diverse actors: government, 
private, networks, service users, and key influencers.  
Perhaps the main point here, which was stressed by Sørensen (2014) but 
latent in our discussion, is how metagoverning frameworks can be utilised to 
advance ‘public service innovation’. This possibly is what many participants 
thought of when they used words like “two heads are better than one”, and 
“collaboration brings in new ideas” into the public service.   
Therefore, understanding how third sector entities are managed, and how 
metagovernance can be made effective, is vital to leveraging public service 
innovation so as to address problems of poverty, fiscal challenges, policy 
implementation, and declining growth rates (Sørensen, 2014). These 
development challenges, participants were overwhelmingly convinced, can 
be better addressed where stable governing standards are applied, making 
metagovernance not merely relevant in terms of enriching actor collaborative 
experiences, but fundamental to the overall public governance reform efforts 
in the state.  
For Gjaltema et al. (2019), meta-governance is so central to contemporary 
governance that future research ought to examine the relationship between 
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‘metagovernance, democratic legitimacy and governance failure’. The 
presumption here is not just a causal link between these variables, but one that 
suggests the possibility of governance failure due to dysfunctionality in how 
metagoverning frameworks work. This study does not pretend to explore such 
causal relations. However, it does provide evidence for what prior research 
on metagovernance already indicates, that ‘stakeholder interests’, ‘shared 
vision’, and ‘ad-hoc arrangements’ are dynamic, but inadequate approaches 
to governing collaboration; and that providing ‘coordinating standards’ is 
essential to ‘institution building’ for new governance purposes. Therefore, 
the absence, or dysfunctionality of such meta-standards, as already implied 
in the works of Gjaltema risk undermining democratic legitimacy of the third 
sector in particular, and successful governance in general.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the study findings indicate that there was no standard governing 
framework that guided collaboration between government officials and third 
sector CEOs, participants seemed to suggest that collaboration was largely 
governed through pragmatic articulation of ‘ad-hoc arrangements’, ‘shared 
vision’ and ‘stakeholder interests.’ This dynamic approach was considered 
unstable by an overwhelming number of participants. This instability, 
however, was to be resolved through the introduction of ‘partner coordinating 
standards’ by government policy officials. Yet, this effort was considered too 
dependent on foreign ‘partner’ support, and alienating to weaker local third 
sector actors. In the light of this, it was perceived by a few third sector CEOs 
as both defective and dubious.  
However, participants’ comments largely reveal a preference for the co-
construction of a standard governing framework that will ensure project 
sustainability, full disclosure of partner accounts, accountable data 
management, resolution of data ownership rights, and inclusive stakeholder 
interests in the state. This approach, it would appear, is likely to provide the 
basis for creatively merging the relevant resilient features of the dynamic and 
the stable governance frameworks to produce an innovative metagovernance 
system. As the evidence suggest, public service innovation in policy articulation 
and service delivery are interlinked with how metagovernance is conducted. 
This, we presume, might provide the basis for lasting metagovernance and 
democratic legitimacy for the third sector in Kano state.  
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Therefore, the preferred option for successful metagovernance of 
collaboration might be a cross between the dynamic framework approach 
with its flexibility and innovation, on the one hand, and the stable framework 
approach with its regularity, predictability, and strategic advantage, on the 
other. Amalgamated, this innovative governance framework might be a 
vehicle for dehomogenising the public service, removing its mental silos, 
and making it more culturally sensitive, developmentally focused and change 
oriented.  
We realise however that the mere design of a governance framework will 
not guarantee the full application of metagovernance. Environmental and 
context specific factors will have to be taken into account. But as governance 
systems across the world come under pressure as a result of rapid changes 
in multiple spheres of life: climate change, the economy, mass migration, 
biotechnology, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, pandemics, and 
security sector reengineering, there seems to be the realisation amongst 
citizens groups and state actors alike that new governing standards anchored 
on shared vision, stakeholder interests, pragmatic arrangements, resilience, 
reflexivity, inclusivity, and critical self-evaluation, have to be co-created and 
co-produced for the common good if new public governance is to deliver 
sustainable development. This, we presume, underscores the centrality of 
boundary spanning, governance standards and metagovernance systems, not 
just in the developing world but, in the developed countries as well.  
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